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Abstract
Sexual reproductive behavior has a necessary social coordina-
tion component as willing and capable partners must both be
in the right place at the right time. It has recently been demon-
strated that many social organizations that support sexual re-
production can evolve in the absence of social coordination
between agents (e.g. herding, assortative mating, and natal
philopatry). In this paper we explore these results by includ-
ing social transfer mechanisms to our agents and contrasting
their reproductive behavior with a control group without so-
cial transfer mechanisms. We conclude that similar behaviors
emerge in our social learning agents as those that emerged in
the non-social learning agents. Social learners were more in-
clined towards natal philopatry. Social learners also evolved
a culture of eusociality including reproductive division of la-
bor.
Introduction
Sexual reproduction is a social behavior as two able partic-
ipants must coordinate their behaviors as well as their posi-
tions in time and space. This social coordination problem
is solved by sexually reproducing species in many different
ways.
Some of the behaviors that enhance finding and attract-
ing a mate include herding (Reynolds, 1987), philopa-
try (Clutton-Brock and Lukas, 2012), assortative mating
(Jiang et al., 2013) and eusociality. These behaviors can
arise through social mechanisms or non-social mechanisms
(Whiten and Ham, 1992).
For instance, consider witnessing a herd of animals cross-
ing a plane to drink water from the river. A well known
explanation of the herd is that the animals in the herd follow
simple social rules of cohesion, alignment and separation
(Reynolds, 1987; Gru¨nbaum and Okubo, 1994; Parrish and
Edelstein-Keshet, 1999). These are social rules and social
mechanisms because to follow these rules the agents must be
aware of each other and make decisions based on informa-
tion about others’ states. However, a non-social explanation
might be that all the animals were getting thirsty in the sun
and independently navigated around obstacles to the river.
With this second explanation, the herd is maintained by the
mutual response of the individuals in the herd with no need
for social awareness or exchange of information.
Prior work (from now on when we reference the prior
work we mean the work in Marriott and Chebib (2015a,b))
showed that herding, philopatry, and assortative mating
arose through non-social mechanisms of convergence and
common descent. This work raised a few questions regard-
ing the role that social interaction plays in many of these ob-
served behaviors. These mating behaviors can be explained
by both non-social and social mechanisms. In many cases
the non-social solution is the simpler one, though it is likely
that certain instances of these behaviors indeed rely on un-
derlying social mechanisms. Further, it is not clear how
these behaviors vary relative to the nature of the underlying
mechanisms.
We have augmented the non-social agents from the prior
work with both individual learning and social learning capa-
bilities. Our null hypothesis is that the same breeding struc-
tures and organizations will be observed as before. How-
ever, we expect that the new adaptive mechanisms will im-
pact these organizations quantitatively and may lead to other
organizations. Our current work can be compared directly
to the prior work but because of implementation differences
between the models we have also conducted control tests of
our own. These control tests involve the same agents but
under conditions in which social learning and/or individual
learning is unavailable.
Social Animals
Animals display different levels of social behavior (Mich-
ener, 1969). Social behavior often is centered on repro-
ductive activities and caring for the young (Trivers, 1972).
Some social animals can extend this social behavior to other
activities like hunting, foraging, and grooming (Lovegrove
and Wissel, 1988; Boesch, 1994; Creel and Creel, 1995;
Nakamura, 2003). The highest categorization of social be-
havior in animals is eusocial (Crespi and Yanega, 1995).
Ants, bees, termites, and some mole rats are categorized as
eusocial (Wilson and Ho¨lldobler, 2005). Humans, of course,
are also very social and loosely fit under the eusocial defini-
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tion (Nowak et al., 2010).
On the opposite side of the spectrum are non-social an-
imals. Non-social animals engage in the minimal amount
of social activity required of a sexual reproductive species,
which is to mate. After mating the mother lays her eggs or
gives birth to her young and leaves them to fend on their
own (Starck, 1998). All parental investment in child rearing
comes prior to birth.
To be classified as eusocial, animals must satisfy three
conditions. Eusocial animals share responsibility for car-
ing for their young, have reproductive division of labor, and
have multi-generational communal cohabitation (and also
philopatry in some definitions (Burda et al., 2000)). This
means that parents live with adult children and older genera-
tions help to care for their grandchildren and others. This, in
particular, allows for sharing of learned information across
generations.
We can see that humans loosely fit into this definition.
We certainly share responsibility for child rearing, and we
certainly have multi-generational communal cohabitation.
However, we do not have reproductive division of labor in
the sense we normally think of. That is, we don’t have a
single “queen” that births us all after breeding with a few
privileged, male courtiers. However, many still like to apply
the label eusocial to humans while some prefer to keep hu-
mans in a category of their own. This debate is not critical
to our discussion.
Model
Our simulation consists of agents in a random geometric
network of resource sites. Each day the agents in a popu-
lation expend energy to move from site to site, forage for
resources, and engage in mating, learning and social learn-
ing. Energy in the simulation normally corresponds to the
time an agent can spend doing activities during a day but ex-
cess stored energy is also used to reproduce. The resources
gathered during a day determines the energy an agent has
for activities in the next day. The net daily energy gain or
loss determines whether an agent lives or dies (if the energy
is depleted) and whether an agent is capable of reproduction
(if stored energy exceeds a threshold).
Agents in our simulation implement the dual inheritance
model (Marriott and Chebib, 2014, 2016b). The dual inher-
itance model is a model incorporating three modes of adap-
tation: phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and sociogenetic. That is,
agents engage in genetic evolution, individual learning and
social leaning. Figure 1 shows how genetic and cultural in-
formation are stored and transferred in the dual inheritance
model.
Genetic and cultural information are stored in separate
information stores called genomes and memomes, respec-
tively. Genomes are inert within the lifetime of an agent
meaning they remain static and are not active in behavior
selection. Their only purpose is to create memomes upon
Figure 1: Dual Inheritance Model
birth and to be replicated in reproductive events. When an
agent is born its memome is created by copying segments of
the genome. This is a process of development that results in
the agents initial cultural information.
Memomes are active in behavior selection over the life-
time of an agent and they can also be altered through in-
dividual learning and social learning events. The memome
selects behaviors through interaction with the environment
and these choices shape the phenotype of the agent. The
phenotype is used for selection and thus an agent’s repro-
ductive success and survival is dependent upon its memome,
its genome, and its environment.
The cognitive model of our agents is inspired by the pan-
demonium model (Jackson, 1987; Franklin, 1997). The
mind of a single agent in our simulation consists of many
specialized sub-agents, or daemons, that compete for con-
trol of the agent. In our model we call these sub-agents
memeplexes and this internal competition is an evolutionary
competition.
Genome
The possible behaviors of agents are encoded in their
genomes as a path of resource sites in the network (our
model extends the model from (Marriott and Chebib,
2015a,b)). We consider each site in the path a gene in the
genome. A gene has three components: gathering, non-
gathering, and travel. At each site an agent has an opportu-
nity to gather resources, perform non-gathering actions like
breed, learn, and/or socialize, and finally must travel to the
next site.
In our current model an agent always gathers resources
when it visits a site. When not depleted a site will always
return a fixed number of resources to an agent gathering at
that site. The energy that an agent spends on gathering is
determined by an agent’s strategy which is encoded in a gene
corresponding to a site. The energy expended in gathering is
always at least the number of resources gathered (one, two
or three) and at most five.
A gene for a site will also encode how much time (i.e. en-
ergy) is spent performing breeding, learning or socializing
actions. Typically the time performing these actions is con-
siderably less than the time gathering resources. Actions at a
site are performed in the following order: gathering, breed-
ing, learning, socializing, and finally traveling to the next
site.
Agents can engage in sexual reproduction when they have
an energy total above a reproduction threshold. In addition,
they need to find another willing and able participant at the
same site. If two agents are engaged in breeding actions at
the same site at the same time and they both have sufficient
stored energy then they will engage in sexual reproduction.
If no mate is found then agents will wait until the next op-
portunity to mate. If the breeding action is unsuccessful an
agent must still spend the energy cost of the breeding action
but not the cost of reproduction.
A genome is passed to the offspring during reproduction.
In this process, the two parents’ genomes are recombined
into a single genome and this genome is given the opportu-
nity to mutate. A genome remains inert during the lifetime
of an agent other than during reproductive events.
At birth each agent’s genome creates a memome. A mem-
ome consists of a set of memeplexes. Each memeplex in
our model represents a possible set of activities for a day.
Memeplexes are formed by copying segments of a genome.
Starting at each gene (i.e. site) in a genome we copy gene
by gene (site by site) into a memeplex (called memes in a
memeplex instead of genes). This continues until the total
energy of a segment approaches the maximum energy avail-
able to an agent for a single day. If copying the next gene
would exceed the maximum energy the segment is complete
and is stored as a memeplex. This means each memeplex
represents a possible set of actions for our agent in a single
day. A memeplex is stored in a memome along with other
memeplexes starting with the same initial site for behavior
selection (see below).
A single memeplex is formed starting at each gene in a
genome. Copying occurs in the forward direction until the
maximum energy is reached. If the end of a genome is
reached copying continues backwards until the maximum
energy is reached. Additionally, segments are copied in a
backwards direction from every gene. This means every
gene in a genome is responsible for two memeplexes in its
memome except the endpoints that are responsible for only
a single memeplex. Notice that since every site in the en-
vironment is not necessarily represented in a genome there
may be sites that do not have corresponding memeplexes.
Memome
As mentioned above memeplexes in a memome are arranged
by starting site. The model bears similarities to the MAP-
elites strategy of multi-objective evolutionary optimization
(Mouret and Clune, 2015). For each site in the environment
a memome will contain zero or more memeplexes that start
at that site. Each memeplex will consist of a path of gath-
ering sites that begin at a particular site and encode a path
that takes at most the maximum energy (time) available to
an agent for a single day. This means each memeplex en-
codes a possible course of actions for an agent for one day
starting at a particular site. From the perspective of the pan-
demonium model, each memeplex is a daemon representing
a single day’s activities.
At the beginning of each day an agent must select a
memeplex that will serve as its behavioral plan for that day.
Only the memeplexes that begin at the current site are pos-
sible and so only these memeplexes are considered when
selecting behavior. Since memeplexes in a memome are or-
ganized by starting site behavior selection begins by activat-
ing all memeplexes that start at an agent’s current site. The
agent selects the memeplex from this set that will maximize
expected resource gain while minimizing expended energy.
This memeplex is then used to determine the actions of the
agent for that day. These actions interact with the environ-
ment to reward the agent with resources which serves as a
selective force on the agent.
A memome is not only active in behavior selection but
also adaptive over the lifetime of an agent. It serves as
the information storage for both individual and social learn-
ing. This means that additional memeplexes are added to
its memome as the agent interacts with its environment and
other agents.
If the memeplex determining an agent’s actions contains
a meme with a non-zero learning component, then the agent
will engage in learning during its day. During individual
learning we apply an evolutionary process. We clone and
mutate the memeplex selected for this day’s actions and add
it to the agent’s memome.
Social learning is handled in the same way as breeding in
our agents. If an agent wants to engage in social learning
it must spend time seeking a partner for exchange. If an-
other agent is also seeking a social learning partner at the
same time and at the same site, then the two agents engage
in an exchange of memeplexes. Each agent copies and ex-
changes the memeplex they used for that day. In transfer,
memeplexs are mutated so noise is added to the system in
this step. The social learning mechanism allows agents to
pass their learned memeplexes on to others in the popula-
tion. Agents are only allowed a single transfer in a day.
Experimental Setup
Simulations are run under two conditions: experimental and
control. We ran both conditions 130 times in a variety of
different environments. The experimental simulation con-
sists of a population of agents with all of the mechanisms
described above. The agents in this group are called social-
izers. There were initially two control populations, one in
which agents can learn individually but not socially (where
agents are called learners), and one in which agents can nei-
ther learn individually nor socially (and where the agents
are called breeders). Learners did not perform significantly
differently from breeders in our experiments so our analysis
will focus on differences between socializers and breeders.
Each simulation run in our current experiment begins with
a population of one hundred agents with randomly gener-
ated genomes. The genes generated at random in this ini-
tialization phase have a chance of having a non-zero breed-
ing component to allow for the initial population to breed.
However, all learning and social learning components of
randomly generated genes are set to zero. They can only
become non-zero through mutation.
Simulation runs are seeded with one hundred randomly
generated individuals. Since they are randomly generated
any genetic similarity occurs by chance alone. As shown
in prior work it is a rare but fortunate occurrence if two
randomly generated agents end up performing breeding ac-
tions at the same site at the same time (Marriott and Chebib,
2015b). Since this is the criteria for breeding in our model
this means our initial population has a risk of not being vi-
able. A run is seeded with one hundred agents so that this
chance is diminished. Under these settings every seed pop-
ulation for a simulation run was viable.
In every run a small proportion of the initial population
are fortunate enough to reproduce. Once initiated these
colonies tend to quickly become viable due to forces of com-
mon descent. That is, since the offspring of these reproduc-
tive events are related to their parents there is a high chance
that they will perform similar behaviors, and importantly,
breed at the same time and place as their parents and others
in their genetic family. This helps make the fledgling colony
viable.
Each run is allowed to run for 5000 days. During the run
some data was gathered continuously and other data was
sampled every 50 days. For every reproductive event, re-
latedness of the parents is measured along both genetic and
phenotypic lines. This allows us to monitor the degree of
genetic and phenotypic assortative mating present in a run.
Further, whenever an agent dies, the number of offspring an
agent had is recorded as well as other characteristics of the
agent’s breeding history (like breeding sites and breeding
partners).
In addition to this continuously gathered data the popula-
tion is also censused every 50 rounds. During censusing, the
population size is recorded as well as many statistics from
Figure 2: Average and maximum generation of active
memeplexes over time in socializers with one standard devi-
ation around the mean.
every agent alive during that day including: the agent’s age,
genome length, generation, memeplex generation, as well
as the concentration of breeding/learning/socializing com-
ponents in the agent’s genome and memome.
Observations and Discussion
We indeed saw evidence of herding, assortative mating and
philopatry as expected. In some cases, there are quantita-
tive differences of note. However, the more exciting results
is the emergence of eusociality in our socializers. Before
discussing eusociality let’s review some evidence of social
learning in our agents.
Social Learning and Cultural Evolution In order to
track social learning and cumulative cultural evolution we
assigned each memeplex a generation. Initial memeplexes
created at birth are assigned generation zero. When a meme-
plex is cloned the new memeplex has a generation one
greater than its parent. Cloning occurs only during learning
and social learning.
Breeders never clone their memeplexes and so they al-
ways act on memeplexes of generation zero. Learners can
increase their memeplex generation but cannot share this
with others. Socializers clone their memeplexes in individ-
ual learning and in social learning. In order to test that cu-
mulative cultural evolution occurred in our socializers we
have measured memeplex generation over time (see Fig. 2).
The maximum and average memeplex generation in-
creases over time. The average memeplex generation grows
much slower but the standard deviation also grows over
time. The minimum memeplex is almost always zero be-
cause there are usually newborns in the world that have not
yet learned the shared memeplex of the population. A rare
Figure 3: Wasted energy in genes in the genome and memes
in the selected memeplex are measured. We show the aver-
age wasted energy in the population over time.
cases when this does not occur is during a colony collapse
in which there are no newborns (see below).
This is evidence that cumulative cultural evolution is oc-
curring (Marriott and Chebib, 2016a). This increase over
time implies that memeplexes are improved in one genera-
tion, shared among the members and passed to the next gen-
eration. Improvements made early are preserved in the pop-
ulation from generation to generation. We have tracked this
optimization over time as well.
In Fig. 3 the divergences between gene optimization and
meme optimization shows that both breeders and socializers
can optimize their behavior. For breeders this can only occur
by optimizing the local parts of their genome that are copied
into the memome and eventually used by the agent. For so-
cializers this means optimizing the shared memeplexes that
are passed between agents.
The data show are averages over the population. New
born socializers have not had a chance to learn the shared
memeplexes and thus have memeplexes similar to the breed-
ers that don’t optimize. The most optimized memeplexes in
the population have 0 wasted energy after about day 500.
Since this is the most optimized the memeplex can get this
slows the cumulative evolution. The only role of the social
learning after this optimization is to maintain the highly op-
timized memeplex (or one of its clones) from generation to
generation.
Another means of optimizing memeplexes is to eliminate
time spent on the non-gathering activities: breeding, learn-
ing, and socializing. We see (Fig. 4) that breeders evolve to
spend more time engaging in these actions over time as se-
lection pressure against this is weak. Cultural evolution oc-
curs much quicker and so the weak pressure becomes much
stronger over the same time.
Figure 4: Proportion of the selected memeplex devoted to
non-gathering actions averaged over all members of the pop-
ulation.
We see that the socializers optimize to spend much less
time on these actions over the first 1000 days. The most op-
timized memeplex would spend no energy breeding, learn-
ing or socializing. This is rare though it occurs. A meme-
plex with no breeding component is quite common and sup-
presses reproduction in the agent if selected repeatedly (see
below). A memeplex with no learning component is not a
big detriment since the memeplex is likely already very op-
timized. A memeplex without a social learning component
makes it impossible to spread itself. While more optimal
these are rare since they die with the host agent. As a result
most optimized memeplexes spend no energy or a very small
amount of energy on breeding and usually a little more en-
ergy on learning and socializing. The success of the meme-
plex depends on its ability to optimize and spread itself.
Herding Although we have not conducted a quantitative
analysis of herding in our agents, we can analyze the un-
derlying mechanisms supporting the herds we observe. We
know from prior work that the herds of the control group
are maintained by common descent (Marriott and Chebib,
2015b). Herds in the socializers are also maintained through
the common decent of the memeplexes shared among mem-
bers of the herd. Herds observed in socializers, even if out-
wardly similar, are being maintained by social mechanisms.
Assortative Mating Assortment of genetically related
parents are not significantly affected by the presence of
learning and social learning (see Fig. 5). There are some
small differences in assortment of phenotypically related
parents though it is not clear how to interpret this slight vari-
ation (see Fig. 6).
Figure 5: Genetic difference between parents. This data is
plotted on a log scale with base 2 and is averaged over the
130 runs.
Figure 6: Phenotypic difference between parents. This data
is plotted on a log scale with base 2 and is averaged over the
130 runs.
Philopatry When an agent would die we would record it
in one of four categories. If the agent died childless then
it could not be evaluated for natal philopatry. If the agent
had children there were three possibilities: they only bred
at their birth site, they sometimes bred at their birth site, or
they never bred at their birth site.
Breeders had an average of 45.6% childless agents while
socializers had an average of 63.6% childless agents. Of
the agents that had children, there were 59.9% of breeder
agents with children that never bred at their birth site. In
the socializers there were 49.7% of agents with children that
never bred at their birth site. Fewer agents are breeding in
the socializers but more of them are breeding at their birth
Figure 7: The number of children each agent had. This data
is plotted on a log scale with base 2. This data is cumulative
over all 130 runs.
site. 52.8% of breeders that bred at their birth site at least
once did not breed elsewhere during their life, whereas in
socializers 75.3% bred only at their birth sites.
While socializers were more likely to die childless they
appear to engage in more natal philopatry than the breeders.
They were more likely to breed at their birth site and they
were more likely to breed exclusively at their birth site.
Eusociality Recall the conditions of eusociality among
animals. Agents must have multi-generational communal
cohabitation, mutual care for the young, and reproductive
division of labor (and sometimes natal philopatry).
Both breeders and socializers have multi-generational
communal cohabitation. We know both display natal
philopatry though it is stronger in socializers. So we must
evaluate whether our agents have reproductive division of
labor and mutual care for the young.
At death we recorded the number of children the agent
had during its life. We have plotted this data showing how
many agents died with n children (see Fig. 7). This plot is
on a logarithmic scale and shows an exponential drop off as
number of children increases. Socializers have a shallower
decrease as number of children increase. No breeders had
more than twenty children. Among socializers some agents,
though rare, have more than ninety children. Combining evi-
dence from above with this we see that both fewer agents are
engaging in sexual reproduction and those that do are repro-
ducing more. This apparently meets the criteria of division
of sexual reproductive labor.
We also gathered data on the age of the eldest agent in
the population. We notice that among the socializers there
are older agents than among the breeders. To have many
children an agent must live long enough to birth each child
and gather the energy required for this activity. This would
require an old agent. It would also require an optimized
memeplex that spent time breeding every day. If this agent
also spread this memeplex to others the efficient breeding
culture can be introduced and maintained in the population.
Agents that do not spend energy breeding can save a lot
of energy, which can extend their lifespan. Recall that the
most optimized memeplexes spend no time breeding so all
energy can be stored for a long productive childless life. If
this agent also spreads this memeplex to others the child-
less culture can be introduced and maintained in the popu-
lation. If the memeplex spread to the whole population then
the population will die out (see below).
Among the optimized memeplexes the dominant kinds are
those with breeding and those without breeding. If spread
each will generate a different kind of culture. In our pop-
ulations these optimized memeplexes occupy agents in the
same population. Not all agents have learned one of these
dominant cultures and engage in sub-optimial culture. This
is common of younger agents. These different cultures com-
pete for the participation of agents.
We treat the sharing of optimal memeplexes to the young
as a type of brood care in our simulation as we have not
realized a brood care mechanism in our agents. Using this
as a tool to evaluate brood care in our agents we can assess
the whether there is mutual care for the young.
Agents in our model do not discriminate when social
learning. They can’t recognize their parents or young.
Though there is a higher probability of two related agents
occupying the same locations in the environment. Social
learning is also bidirectional. Both agents act as teachers
and learners. However, usually only the less experienced
agent benefits from this exchange.
Now consider an agent with an optimized memeplex that
has a breeding component. After some time this agent pro-
duces an offspring. The newborn has a sub-optimal meme-
plex and will likely travel a different path than the parent. If
the offspring is lucky in the next few days the agent will
encounter its parent and engage in social learning. Then
the offspring may become an optimal breeder as well. This
lucky agent provided direct parent-child brood care. This is
not the only possibility.
The offspring occupies a population with others. Some
may be older siblings, cousins, uncles, etc. while others are
more distantly related. When the offspring first gets a chance
to socially learn it might learn from one of these other agents
(remember they don’t discriminate). This results in the ex-
change of sub-optimal memeplexes but possibly also the en-
culturation of some sub-optimal culture that brings the off-
spring away from its parent. We might consider this a kind
of mutual brood care.
Finally, let’s imagine one of the others in the population
has an optimal memeplex that avoids breeding. This agent
cannot reproduce and create its own brood. It can only
spread its memeplexes to the offspring of agents that breed.
Thus, the existence of this culture relies on the care of other
agent’s offspring. We have strong evidence that these cul-
tures do indeed exist (see below).
Together this evidence suggests that our socializers have
emerged a type of eusociality. The have multi-generational
cohabitation with mutual care for the young. Like humans
they have an interesting culture based division of reproduc-
tive labor. The also engage in natal philopatry more often
than the breeders.
Colony Collapse When a highly optimized memeplex has
no breeding component but does have social learning it can
spread into the population as discussed above. The danger
of this culture is that if every agent in the population follows
it then the population will die out.
This cultural suppression can have catastrophic conse-
quences. A typical run will begin with a handful small
colonies of agents in different parts of the random geomet-
ric network. When a culture of not breeding emerges and
spreads to every agent in one of these colonies the popula-
tion dies out. In 21 out of 100 socializer runs this led to
every agent in the simulation dying before round 5000. This
never occurs in breeder or learner runs. Inspection of the
memeplexes of agents during a collapse confirms that there
are no breeding components and most agents have a large
store of energy and a long lifespan.
Conclusion
We were curious how social learning would affect strategies
of sexual reproduction in our simulated agents. We did not
see significant differences between the assortative behavior
of breeders and socializers. We interpret this result as ad-
ditional evidence that assortment can and probably is main-
tained in most populations by non-social forces.
Social learning also appeared to enforce a higher rate of
natal philopatry. While fewer social learning agents bred,
more of them bred at their birth sites and more of them bred
exclusively at their birth site. This suggests that sociality
and natal philopatry may correlate in natural populations.
Finally after adding social learning to our agents we find
that they evolve a culture of eusocial reproduction. Repro-
ductive labor is more concentrated both in a sub-population
and occasionally within agents that breed considerably more
than others in the population.
All agents that engage in social learning can be consid-
ered to engage in brood care by sharing culturally learned
information to others. As they don’t discriminate when so-
cial learning and there is multi-generational cohabitation this
brood care occurs between agents of different generations
and of different relatedness.
These are the criteria for eusociality applied to animals
and in applying these criteria to our agents we can see there
is evidence to call them eusocial. It is interesting to us that
our relatively simple social exchange mechanism is strong
enough to evolve a eusocial culture in our agents. It is note-
worthy that this eusociality is maintained by cultural forces
not genetic forces. That is, whether our social agents breed
or not is not dependent upon their genetics, but rather on
their learned culture.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the advice of anonymous
reviewers. Jobran Chebib was supported by the Swiss Na-
tional Science Foundation (grant PP00P3 144846/1 awarded
to Fre´de´ric Guillaume).
References
Boesch, C. (1994). Cooperative hunting in wild chim-
panzees. Animal Behaviour, 48(3):653–667.
Burda, H., Honeycutt, R. L., Begall, S., Locker-Gru¨tjen, O.,
and Scharff, A. (2000). Are naked and common mole-
rats eusocial and if so, why? Behavioral Ecology and
Sociobiology, 47(5):293–303.
Clutton-Brock, T. and Lukas, D. (2012). The evolution
of social philopatry and dispersal in female mammals.
Molecular Ecology, 21(3):472–492.
Creel, S. and Creel, N. M. (1995). Communal hunting and
pack size in african wild dogs, lycaon pictus. Animal
Behaviour, 50(5):1325–1339.
Crespi, B. J. and Yanega, D. (1995). The definition of euso-
ciality. Behavioral Ecology, 6(1):109–115.
Franklin, S. (1997). Artificial minds. MIT press.
Gru¨nbaum, D. and Okubo, A. (1994). Modelling social an-
imal aggregations. In Frontiers in mathematical biol-
ogy, pages 296–325. Springer.
Jackson, J. V. (1987). Idea for a mind. ACM SIGART Bul-
letin, (101):23–26.
Jiang, Y., Bolnick, D. I., and Kirkpatrick, M. (2013). As-
sortative mating in animals. The American Naturalist,
181(6):E125–E138.
Lovegrove, B. and Wissel, C. (1988). Sociality in molerats.
Oecologia, 74(4):600–606.
Marriott, C. and Chebib, J. (2014). The effect of social learn-
ing on individual learning and evolution. In The Four-
teenth Conference on the Synthesis and Simulation of
Living Systems, pages 736–743. MIT Press.
Marriott, C. and Chebib, J. (2015a). Emergence-focused de-
sign in complex system simulation. In European Con-
ference on Artificial Life. MIT Press.
Marriott, C. and Chebib, J. (2015b). Finding a mate with no
social skills. In Proceedings of the 2015 conference on
Genetic and Evolutionary Computation. ACM.
Marriott, C. and Chebib, J. (2016a). Divergent cumulative
cultural evolution. In Proceedings of the 2016 Confer-
ence on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems.
MIT Press.
Marriott, C. and Chebib, J. (2016b). Modelling the evolution
of gene-culture divergence. In Proceedings of the 2016
Conference on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living
Systems. MIT Press.
Michener, C. D. (1969). Comparative social behavior of
bees. Annual review of entomology, 14(1):299–342.
Mouret, J.-B. and Clune, J. (2015). Illuminating
search spaces by mapping elites. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1504.04909.
Nakamura, M. (2003). gatherings of social grooming among
wild chimpanzees: implications for evolution of social-
ity. Journal of human evolution, 44(1):59–71.
Nowak, M. A., Tarnita, C. E., and Wilson, E. O. (2010).
The evolution of eusociality. Nature, 466(7310):1057–
1062.
Parrish, J. K. and Edelstein-Keshet, L. (1999). Complexity,
pattern, and evolutionary trade-offs in animal aggrega-
tion. Science, 284(5411):99–101.
Reynolds, C. W. (1987). Flocks, herds and schools: A dis-
tributed behavioral model. ACM Siggraph Computer
Graphics, 21(4):25–34.
Starck, J. M. (1998). Avian growth and development: evolu-
tion within the altricial-precocial spectrum. Number 8.
Oxford University Press on Demand.
Trivers, R. (1972). Parental investment and sexual selection,
volume 136. Biological Laboratories, Harvard Univer-
sity.
Whiten, A. and Ham, R. (1992). On the nature and evolution
of imitation in the animal kingdom: reappraisal of a
century of research. Advances in the Study of Behavior,
21:239–283.
Wilson, E. O. and Ho¨lldobler, B. (2005). Eusociality: ori-
gin and consequences. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,
102(38):13367–13371.
